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1 Introduction
Governance reform in Africa has lost its way.
Twenty years after ‘good governance’ moved to
the centre-stage in international declarations,
official aid policies and non-governmental
advocacy alike, the results of efforts to improve
the way African countries are ruled remain
seriously insufficient. This refers not only to the
high-level, headline-grabbing episodes that tend
to dominate media coverage of the region, but
also to more mundane aspects of the everyday
exercise of power. Below the apex of the national
political systems and behind the headlines, in
most parts of sub-Saharan Africa most of the
time, governance is failing to work for
development.
More technically, not enough is being done by
national governments, by local authorities or by
anyone else to provide the elementary public
goods that are key preconditions for progress in
any poor market economy.1 From the facilitation
of economic enterprise to the maintenance of
social peace or the protection of public health,
today’s regimes perform badly. In quite a few
cases, they do worse than they did in the still-
remembered past. In most places, corruption is
ingrained and routine. As a result, in the typical
economy, there is some measure of economic
growth, but the vital investments needed for this
to be sustained and become transformative fail
to take place. The better-off solve their livelihood
problems privately, while for the majority, life
remains harsh, troubled and short. Above all, the
synergies between economic, social and political
progress that are the key to genuine
development are systematically blocked.
Everyone has their own view of who is to blame
for this situation, and there is a correspondingly
long list of obstacles to be overcome. These
typically include both the vested interests of
powerful elites in the continuation of the present
arrangements, and the pusillanimity and mixed
motives of the international community where
Africa is concerned. These are important issues.
However, the focus of this article is on none of
these matters, but on something else – the
elements of the situation that have to do not
with power or ill-will, but rather with the lack of
understanding and a shared inability to conceive
alternative scenarios and pathways.
1.1 A knowledge deficit
At the heart of the current impasse in policy-
thinking in Africa and about Africa, I believe
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there is – among other things – a significant
knowledge gap. International policy towards sub-
Saharan Africa has rested for a number of years
on the notion that improved aid flows to the
region can be traded for improved country
governance. This idea meets the political needs
of the aid lobby in the North, but is unrealistic in
several ways. Among other things, it implies that
someone, somewhere, knows how to bring about
developmental governance, and this would be
simple to achieve if only Africa’s leaders would
try harder. The truth is, however, that no one
really knows how to build the type of governance
that Africa needs. The forms of governance that
might work better for development under the
specific conditions yielded by African history and
geography are not known. We know what is
wrong, we know why things are not working, but
we do not know for sure what would work better,
even in broad and imprecise terms.
This lack of knowledge, or of empirically rooted
understanding, extends beyond the policy worlds
to the research community specialising in
African affairs. It is, to repeat, not the only
barrier to forward movement; but it certainly
renders the tasks of challenging powerful vested
interests and producing coordinated and
enlightened action very much more difficult than
they would otherwise be.
This article is concerned with whether anything
can be done to address this particular part of the
African development dilemma. It introduces an
international research initiative called the Africa
Power and Politics Programme (APPP), whose
central purpose is to generate a body of new
knowledge on the difficult question of the way
forward in African governance.
1.2 The Africa Power and Politics Programme
The APPP is a five-year undertaking by a
consortium of research organisations based in
Ghana, Niger, Uganda, the UK, France and the
USA (www.institutions-africa.org). Our declared
aim is to identify forms of governance that would
– if more widely adopted – work significantly
better for development and poverty reduction
than the arrangements currently in place. We
are dissatisfied with the conventional appeal for
‘good governance’ and convinced by Grindle’s
(2004, 2007) argument that the priority is to
identify solutions that are ‘good enough’ to meet
the immediate challenges facing Africa’s
peoples. We aim to design and begin to carry out
a programme of empirical investigation that will
support theorising about what works better and
why, filling a gap in both policy-thinking and
mainstream academic literature on African
development.
One of the points of departure of the APPP is
that ‘good governance’ provides an inadequate
agenda for Africa, because it contains a surfeit of
purportedly universal notions about what is good
which actually reflect certain rather specific
features of the recent history of the West. We
think it fails to reflect the more genuinely
universal experience that institutions work
better when they build on what exists, make use
of indigenous institutional creativity or are
otherwise rooted in their sociocultural context.
They work badly when they rely heavily on the
implantation, without major modification, of
models that have worked well in other times and
places (Shivakumar 2005; Hyden 2006, 2008).
We began by expressing this metaphorically.
Thus, one of our initial ‘hunches’ or working
hypotheses was that better results are obtained
by economic and political institutions that ‘work
with the grain’ of the host society. Elsewhere, we
declared in favour of public action that is
‘anchored in local realities’. In other terms, we
were interested in how Africa’s own institutional
resources and historical legacies might be
harnessed for developmental purposes, rather
than sidelined or viewed merely as barriers to
changes whose desirability has been defined a
priori. The first task we confronted as a
programme was how to turn this set of issues
into a feasible agenda of research.
The remainder of this article is concerned with
three aspects of this challenge:
? The nature of the knowledge gap that needs
to be filled;
? The programme’s methodological options;
? Operationalising the notion of ‘working with
the grain’.
In each of these areas, I limit myself to
summarising the choices we have made. A final
section explains how these are reflected in the
work of the programme as represented in the
remainder of this IDS Bulletin.
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2 What sort of knowledge gap?
Some readers may be surprised or sceptical
about the claim that there is a gap in knowledge,
given the recent outpouring of relevant research
in both institutional economics and political
science. However, I would insist that existing
research-based literature does not provide clear
answers to the questions now being posed about
Africa.
2.1 Disaggregating Africa
Some questions have no doubt been settled. On
the one hand, the large literature based on
regression analysis and cross-country statistics
has helped to establish that ‘institutions rule’
when it comes to the major determinants of
development performance, including the
effectiveness of aid (Rodrik et al. 2004). It has
been able to tell us that various institutional
arrangements can perform certain essential
functions – thereby placing a large question-
mark over policy doctrines that prescribe only
one basic way of doing things – what Evans
(2004) calls ‘institutional monocropping’.
However, it cannot tell us which arrangements
are right for which group of countries at which
stage in their development process. Leading
practitioners of this art are inclined to
recommend historical case studies using time-
series data as the best way of handling these vital
questions (Rodrik 2003; Kohli 2004). We agree.
On the other hand, the literature on Africa that
sits squarely in this historical-institutionalist
tradition has been preoccupied with the rather
narrow question of what distinguishes African
development experience from that of the rest of
the world, or from the rest of the world as it now
is. This was essential groundwork. Notably, the
succession of political scientists who between
the 1970s and 1990s adapted Max Weber’s
concept of patrimonial authority to the analysis
of contemporary African state formation
performed an important service in relocating
African experience into the mainstream of
comparative history (Eisenstadt 1972; Levine
1980; Médard 1982; Bratton and van de Walle
1997). The concept of neo-patrimonialism was
useful in that it both identified a key common
feature of post-colonial arrangements across the
region, and took away the sense that African
governance patterns are sui generis. Although, as
it has passed into common use, this concept has
acquired a baggage of negative connotations,
neo-patrimonialism was and remains a helpfully
universal and non-normative concept.
What is true, however, is that establishing the
specificity of the post-colonial state in Africa has
rather got in the way of some other tasks. One is
the task of explaining the general pattern – since
it ought not to be taken as explaining itself
(Leonard and Straus 2003). The other is
distinguishing between the relatively benign and
the plainly regressive forms of the general
pattern. Those who deploy the concept of neo-
patrimonialism do not generally imply or believe
that it or its manifestations are the same
everywhere. But with a few important exceptions
(Berry 1993; Englebert 2002; Boone 2003), their
work is not mainly or directly comparative across
African countries or regimes. This has,
undoubtedly, helped to create a gap in
knowledge, and it is to this gap that the APPP is
addressed. We argue that, when thinking about
pathways towards development, it is worth
distinguishing among the different forms that
neo-patrimonial rule can take. We should at least
consider the possibility that there are forms of
the neo-patrimonial state that combine
patronage politics with quite a high degree of
developmental effectiveness, as recognised 20
years ago by Richard Crook (1989, 1990).
2.2 Focusing on the right timescale
In this respect, we are influenced by those like
Khan (2006), Meisel and Aoudia (2008), Mick
Moore et al. (Centre for the Future State 2010)
and Levy (2010) who, like Grindle, question
whether good advice on governance for
development can be derived by fitting trend lines
to large sets of cross-national statistical data. We
even doubt the relevance of the excellent
qualitative studies now appearing, which take on
the broad sweep of institutional development in
human history (Acemoglu et al. 2005; North et al.
2009). In the poorest countries of Asia and Africa,
attention needs to be focused on immediate
priorities and whether the standard, first-best
institutional approaches are both practical and
affordable. In general, pragmatic solutions that
build upon what already exists are preferable.
With Crook and Khan, we suspect that, in Africa
just as in Asia, patronage politics and corruption
can work in ways that block provision of the
public goods that are essential to reasonably
inclusive economic growth and human
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development. But they can also work in ways
that, while being second-best in many respects,
are nonetheless consistent with rapid economic
and social progress. With Moore (1994; Centre of
the Future State 2010) and Granovetter (1985),
we are persuaded that social networks and other
informal arrangements can perform the role of
enabling long-distance market transactions to
take place efficiently – that is, fulfill the function
that mainstream institutional economics assigns
only to formal economic institutions. This leads
to such questions as: is there a ‘developmental
neo-patrimonialism’? If so, what does it look like,
at macro, meso and micro levels? And what are
the preconditions for its emergence?
These are all comparative questions. They are
not new. There is, in fact, quite a rich literature
on comparative institutions and the state in both
North-East and South-East Asia devoted to
exactly these issues. This literature is the source
of many of the ideas we now want to pursue in
relation to African examples and issues. There
are also some sets of Africa–Asia comparisons
which explicitly pose questions for Africanists.
A current programme led from the University of
Leiden in the Netherlands
(www.trackingdevelopment.net) had added very
significantly to that literature by undertaking
carefully paired comparisons between four
African and four South-East Asian countries with
a view to identifying the critical factors
explaining the notable divergences in
development performance that immediately
come into view (van Donge et al. 2010).
As a rule, however, Asia/Africa comparisons
highlight some missing elements in the African
policy scenario or institutional framework, but
shed little light on the question of what might be
done about it. Generally, although the differences
in historical legacies and cultural contexts
between the regions are often exaggerated,
particularly in Africa, direct transfer of Asian
ways of doing things is not an option. There is
therefore an acute need for comparative work
that indicates missed opportunities and possible
new avenues drawing on Africa’s own experience.
Our starting point in APPP is that this is an
under-utilised research resource. We need to
draw more comprehensively and systematically
on Africa’s own experience in order to think
sensibly about the implications of the growing
development gap with East Asia.
3 Designing the research
3.1 Empirical scope
For the APPP, governance encompasses the
exercise of power in the management of society’s
resources at all levels, from the offices of
presidents to the back yards of urban
neighbourhoods and the killing fields of local
conflict zones. Our research does not limit itself
to events and processes at the apex of state
power, but aims to assemble a body of evidence
on the full range of functions performed more or
less badly by organs of the central or local state,
from the administration of justice to the
protection of natural resources or prevention of
infantile dysentery.
There are two reasons for this choice. First, we
wish to challenge conventional nostrums about
good governance that are taken to apply
comprehensively and with few reservations to
today’s development challenges in Africa. We
therefore need evidence that is sufficiently cross-
cutting in terms of sectors or types of public goods
to support a comprehensive response. Second, by
including a variety of national and sub-national
issue-areas in the scope of the programme, we
also maximise our chances of discovering relevant
empirical variation on which to test our emerging
theories. The insufficiency of such variation has
been and remains a challenge for anyone trying to
answer the questions we are posing.
On this basis, we are undertaking empirical work
in six Research Streams, designated as follows:
? Business and politics
? State bureaucracies
? Religion and the state
? Local justice and dispute settlement
? Parliamentarians
? Local governance and leadership.
In one case, ‘Business and politics’, work is under
way in two distinct sub-streams, one concerned
with general issues and one focused on cotton
sector reforms in the Sahel, raising the effective
number of streams to seven.
While in this respect we wish to cast the net
wide, we also want to be able to generate some
overarching conclusions about governance for
development in Africa. ‘Scaling up’ from findings
about, say, local administration of justice or
politician–business interactions to general
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propositions about developmental governance is
not going to be a matter of simple inference.
Nevertheless, we want the relationship between
our evidence and our policy-relevant conclusions
to be as compelling as possible. We have
therefore tried to ensure that the work in each
stream gives us real ‘causal leverage’ on our
emerging hypotheses, so that the programme as
a whole generates the elements of a policy-
relevant middle-range theory. All the streams are
looking for variations in the way different
governance arrangements affect key
intermediate outcomes that are known to be
critical to final development outcomes. Across
the streams, we are taking the adequacy of
provision of essential public goods as a fulcrum
for our empirical work and initial theorising.
3.2 Method: systematic comparison and middle-range
theory
In thinking about the design of the APPP’s
empirical work, we have been consciously trying
to map out a middle course, methodologically
speaking, between the two extremes of
multivariate statistical analysis requiring large
datasets and intensive studies of single cases.2 In
this, we have been assisted by having at our
disposal a multidisciplinary team, including
experienced practitioners of several
methodological traditions. Within the team, we
have strong advocates of the ‘Manchester’
tradition of ethnographic fieldwork and skilled
practitioners of large-N multivariate analysis as
well as advocates of the middle way represented
by a systematic approach to small-N comparative
studies.
We agree that so long as our theoretical
propositions remain largely undeveloped, we need
a relatively inductive, exploratory approach.
Statistical testing would therefore be
inappropriate even if relevant datasets were
available or could be affordably generated.
Additionally, the subject matter of neo-
patrimonial governance does not lend itself to
standardised measurement. Neo-patrimonial
states are said to be hybrids of formal legal-
bureaucratic structures and informal,
patrimonial, arrangements, so it is the variations
among such hybrids that interest us. There has to
be a concern that any standardised indicators of
institutional variation that might be devised
would, like those currently available, only capture
differences in the formal façade of what happens.
We also have a consensus that we want to go
beyond the traditional anthropological
monograph approach and its modern variants,
where a single local case study or a loosely linked
set of such studies provides the sole basis for
theory development (Olivier de Sardan 2005).
Experience suggests that with such an approach
it is possible at most to shed doubt on some
prevailing theory or picture of reality.
Monographic approaches do not serve well the
development of new causal theories, and this
programme is an opportunity to show that it is
possible to do better, without compromising on
the intensity and quality of the required
fieldwork.
An attractive option is, therefore, what is
provided by the major strand of methodological
thinking in comparative politics and historical
sociology which has emerged in recent decades in
opposition to the mainstream quantitativism.
The major figures in this stream, such as Collier
(Collier et al. 2004), Ragin (1987) and Gerring
(2007), provide a clear and cogent prospectus to
which we are generally attracted. The common
elements are a systematic approach to the
selection of cases for comparative study, making
use of small sets of theoretically interesting
variables, and employing complementary
techniques of within-case comparison and causal
‘process tracing’ to buttress and inform the
cross-case analysis. There is a strong case for
thinking that this style of research is not only
good for theory building, but particularly suited
to the type of middle-range theorising that
policymakers appreciate (George and Bennett
2005). The full prospectus has requirements
which we have struggled to meet but continue to
treat as the relevant standard to which to aspire.
One of the challenging steps, in practice, has
been to arrive at a sufficiently plausible set of
explanatory variables with which to approach
case selection. We have been eager to give an
operational meaning to our initial hunch about
‘working with the grain’. We have been keen to
articulate what we think are the significant
differences among Africa’s neo-patrimonial
regimes. But this has been a major research task
on its own. We have had not just to ransack what
we think we know about the facts. We have also
had to go back to basics conceptually, and find
our way around some sticky controversies which
commonly divide researchers in African
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development studies. Through a combination of
empirical and conceptual investigation, however,
we are now in a position where some major
issues can be considered clarified, if not settled.
4 Beyond metaphor: operationalising the ‘grain’
hypothesis
The idea of ‘working with the grain’ is powerfully
expressive in English for anyone who has some
experience or carpentry or wood-working of some
kind. But for anyone whose practical experience
of carpentry is limited, it is liable to confusion
with metaphors other than the one intended.3
The same applies, to some extent, to the notion
of ‘anchorage’ when disconnected from
experience with ships, boats or hot-air balloons.
Anyway, metaphors are not scientific concepts.
An important part of the intellectual challenge
posed by the programme has been to determine
what kinds of concepts are good for formulating
testable and potentially policy-relevant
propositions along the lines suggested by these
metaphorical statements of our working
hypothesis.
4.1 From public goods to political economy
An important first step in that direction was the
decision to focus research in all of the streams on
major deficits in the provision of key public
goods. As well as concentrating attention on
what many specialists would accept as a critical
intermediate variable in development processes,
it allowed us not to be distracted by discussions
about the validity of the standard final outcome
measures, about whether the Millennium
Development Goals set an appropriate standard
for Africa, and so on. Not less importantly, it
helped us to incorporate into our thinking
concepts and modes of analysis, which have been
used in other connections to explain patterns of
public goods provision and under-provision,
notably the various branches of rational-choice,
social-mechanism and game theory (Ostrom
1990; Olson 1993; Hedström and Swedberg 1998;
Sandler 2001). In this way, APPP has arrived at a
position where its empirically grounded
propositions are informed by a much wider field
of general scholarship in the social sciences than
any of us anticipated at the outset.
In a number of our research streams, asking
questions about unresolved collective-action
problems in relation to particular public goods
has helped us to think about one basic sense in
which institutions need to be anchored in local
realities. Institutions which overcome the key
bottlenecks in public goods provision will be ones
that by accident or design address the relevant
collective action problems. In contrast,
institutions that have been designed elsewhere
or with little or no connection to the specific
factors in play will be unlikely to meet the real
needs of the situation. The operational form of
the hypothesis then becomes: public goods
delivered better when institutions are shaped in
such a way as to address the actually prevailing
collective-action problems, and worse when they
are imported from outside this local reality.
The problems to which this thinking is applicable
are not just local. For example, a disciplined
public bureaucracy can be considered as an
under-provided public good, subject to the
‘tragedy of the commons’ type of social action
dilemma. This helps to focus thinking on the
conditions under which an African political
leadership would be motivated to protect this
public good and to set limits to the bureaucratic
equivalent of overgrazing the range-lands, a
different and better question than how
performance against standard yardsticks of good
governance may be expected to improve. The
hypothesis becomes: the public good will be
better served when it becomes of interest to the
political leadership to impose limits on socially
destructive behaviours, and worse when any such
limitations (e.g. ‘zero tolerance of corruption’)
are promoted independently of elite interest
calculations (e.g. as donor conditionalities).
4.2 The place of culture
However, our hypothesis is not just about the
public choice aspect of local anchorage. It is also
about one of the conditions under which
institutional choices that have a problem-solving
potential are also capable of being understood,
adopted and supported by the people that are
involved in them. What else then is conveyed by
‘working with the grain’?
A good first answer to this question is that
solutions which work tend to be culturally
embedded. This was the idea pursued in Tim
Kelsall’s article ‘Going with the Grain in African
Development?’ (Kelsall 2008). The article
interpreted the grain metaphor in what is
probably the most straightforward way, where
the grain refers to some of the more widely
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observed features of the social fabric of sub-
Saharan African societies. It identified a core set
of beliefs and values – concerning power,
accountability and social morality – that have
proven extremely durable and remain powerful
drivers of behaviour. Development efforts, the
argument went, should stop treating these
cultural elements as problems and start
harnessing them in practical ways.
The idea of building on the extant notions of
moral obligation and interpersonal
accountability in the region, as Kelsall put it,
remains part of the APPP vision. Aspects of the
idea have been vigorously questioned (Olivier de
Sardan 2008). However, we have quite a broad
consensus around the original proposition as
qualified and refined in the following three ways.
First, we must be wary of facile and old-fashioned
assumptions about culture and its relationship to
behaviour. On a theoretical level, we tend to
agree with Swidler in seeing the causal role of
culture ‘not in defining ends of action, but in
providing cultural components that are used to
construct strategies of action’. So culture shapes
action only insofar as the available cultural
‘repertoire’ limits the feasible action strategies
(Swidler 1986). From a methodological point of
view, we believe the relevant cultural
components need to be uncovered empirically
and not assumed.
Second, working with the grain should not mean
making unproven claims about shared values
(e.g. within ethnic groups) in explaining
behaviour when more parsimonious and easily
demonstrated explanations are available. In this
sense, we have drawn lessons from the insights
into voting and collective action among people of
similar or different ethnic backgrounds produced
by Daniel Posner and his colleagues (Posner
2005; Habyarimana et al. 2009).
Finally and importantly, while rational choice
analysis provides a healthy antidote to premature
invocation of explanations in terms ‘shared
values’, ‘ethnic community’ and suchlike, it may
not provide a comprehensive alternative. As
Kelsall (2009) has shown, contextually modified
game-theoretic concepts can be made to
illuminate a wide range of social situations in
ways that are potentially highly relevant to
APPP’s theory-building effort.4 However, this
does not mean that shared values have no role to
play in explaining significant differences in
outcomes. For example, the finding that some
Tanzanian villages solve difficult problems of
collective action while others, similarly placed,
do not, may only be explicable with reference to
the observation that in some of the former cases,
villagers are members of a single church. They
have shared moral commitments which are able
to be mobilised.
In a broadly similar vein, Greif (2006) provides a
game-theoretic account of why institutional
elements ‘inherited from the past’ are likely to
be useful in developing ways of addressing
collective action problems. Creating new
institutions from scratch is simply too costly in
terms of the bargaining, coordination, search and
learning costs. Attempts to do so, for example by
importing ‘best practices’ from the outside,
typically fail. An implication is that successful
institutions are typically hybrids of ‘imported’
and ‘local’ elements (which is not to imply that
all hybrids are successful).
The programme hypothesis about working with
the grain thus translates as follows. The
institutions that will work best for public goods
provision and development in the African
context are ones that, by design or otherwise,
have a local problem-solving character and build
on relevant components of the available cultural
repertoire, whether in the form of extant beliefs
or values or in the form of widely recognised
behavioural templates.
4.3 Implications
To the extent that the research confirms this
hypothesis or a further refinement of it, what are
the implications for policy? Answering this
question entails thinking about how the
behaviours of donors, governments and other
influential actors might allow more space than
they do at present for both the problem-solving
arrangements and the cultural borrowing (or
institutional hybridisation) that we find to be too
often missing. This is bringing us hard up
against the political economy of the aid
relationship itself, and the ways in which it
currently shapes the environment in which
institutional choices are made or avoided. The
policy messages that are likely to come out of the
research as a whole seem likely to centre on this
aspect.
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5 What the research is telling us
The contributions to this IDS Bulletin illustrate
further how the programme has arrived at these
positions. At the same time, they show how our
core hypotheses are being articulated and used
to interrogate the evidence on particular topics.
Five articles stem from our largest stream, on
Local Governance and Leadership, and two
provide overviews. The theory-oriented
contribution by Booth brings out the way
differences among types of regime and forms of
aid affect three proximate determinants of the
quality of public goods provision. Olivier de
Sardan then sets the scene with particular
reference to Francophone West Africa. He shows
that no less than eight ‘modes of local
governance’ are relevant to the issue of public
service delivery, the typical pattern being co-
delivery involving players operating in at least
four of these modes.
Three articles report country findings. Olivier de
Sardan analyses evidence from three small towns
in Niger showing how some key bottlenecks in
public goods provision are addressed and others
not. Cammack’s contribution presents equivalent
findings from Malawi. Although these two country
studies place emphasis in different places, they
coincide with each other and with Booth’s
overview in showing that the critical factors
include the way provider disciplines are affected
by the prevailing politics and the extent to which
problem-solving collective action is feasible within
the local governance system. Workman extends
this kind of thinking to the co-production of public
goods between a municipal council and interest-
based associations in Sierra Leone, identifying a
particular kind of reciprocity between the
partners as a key success factor.
The article by Crook, Asante and Brobbey
reports on the main study undertaken within the
Local Justice and Dispute Settlement stream.
The study speaks strongly to the theme that the
best forms of public goods delivery are practical
hybrids, drawing on both modern professional
standards and local cultural repertoires.
The final two articles, from the Business and
Politics stream, offer a comparative synthesis
and a country study for Malawi. The analysis
presented by Kelsall makes the case for
revisiting the orthodox view of the relationship
between neo-patrimonial politics and country
economic performance. As Cammack then
explains with reference to three phases in
Malawi, regimes differ in the ways they generate
and use economic rents, with significant
implications for the role played by national
economic technocracies. With their attention to
within-Africa differences in regime performance
and their suggestions about coming to terms
with solutions that are rooted in African
experience, these articles resonate with the
findings on local governance and local justice.
They also provide further support to the main
contention of this article, that the idea of
‘working with the grain’ can be translated into
well-supported operational hypotheses.
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Notes
* This article is the product of collective efforts
and a rich ongoing discussion within the
Africa Power and Politics Programme.
However, since we agree on some issues and
agree to disagree on others, I assume
responsibility for the judgements expressed,
including those on the general orientation of
the programme and its emerging findings.
1 We give ‘public goods’ a relatively inclusive
meaning, so that it refers not just to goods
which are under-supplied by private action
because their benefits spill over to those not
contributing to the cost, but also to the
somewhat broader set of goods and services
with strong positive social externalities which
are under-produced because of what are
technically called information imperfections.
2 For a fuller discussion, see Booth (2008).
3 Those connected with ‘grain’ as in the seed of
cereals like wheat or maize, for example.
4 And social networks can explain what it is
sometimes supposed that only shared values
can explain (Moore 1994).
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